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A (k,n)-threshold secret-sharing scheme allows for a string to be split into n shares in such a way that any
subset of at least k shares suffices to recover the secret string, but such that any subset of at most k− 1 shares
contains no information about the secret. Quantum secret-sharing schemes extend this idea to the sharing
of quantum states. Here we propose a method of performing computation on quantum shared secrets. We
introduce a (n,n)-quantum secret sharing scheme together with a set of protocols that allow quantum circuits
to be evaluated on the shared secret without the need to decode the secret. We consider a multipartite setting,
with each participant holding a share of the secret. We show that if there exists at least one honest participant,
no group of dishonest participants can recover any information about the shared secret, independent of their
deviations from the protocol.
The connected nature of modern computing infrastructure
has led to the widespread adoption of distributed and del-
egated computation [1], with hard computational tasks rou-
tinely delegated to remote computers. In such a setting, secu-
rity of the computation can be a very real concern. For several
decades it has been understood that quantum cryptography of-
fers stronger security for key distribution than is possible us-
ing purely classical communication over untrusted channels
[2, 3]. More recently, quantum protocols have appeared for
secure computation tasks such as secure multi-party compu-
tation [4], blind computation [5–8] and verifiable delegated
computation [9–13]. In the present manuscript, we focus on
a different form of secure computation, namely the evaluation
of quantum circuits on shared secrets.
In a secret sharing scheme, an r-bit string r which is meant
to be kept a secret, is encrypted into an s-bit string s. These
s bits are subsequently distributed among n parties, with the
intention that whenever too few of the parties collude, the col-
luding parties cannot perfectly recover the secret message r.
The reversibility of the encryption allows the secret message
r to be recovered when all of the n-parties assemble the data
that they were distributed. In a (k,n)-threshold scheme for
classical secret sharing [14, 15], it is required that no group
with fewer than k colluding parties can reconstruct the secret
message r, and any k parties can reconstruct r. Similarly in a
(k,n)-threshold quantum secret sharing scheme, a secret quan-
tum state of s qubits is shared among n parties such that no
group fewer than k colluding parties can reconstruct the se-
cret quantum state [16–20], and any k parties can reconstruct
the secret quantum state. Here, we present an (n,n)-threshold
quantum secret sharing scheme that also supports evaluation
of quantum circuits on the shared secret.
Our secret sharing scheme with computation can be seen as
a form of secure delegated multipartite quantum computation
where the delegated computation is made public. We empha-
size that our scheme is not naturally a blind quantum compu-
tation scheme, because blind quantum computation also re-
quires the intended quantum computation kept secret from
the evaluator [31]. As such, the setting we consider is more
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closely related to that of quantum homomorphic encryption
schemes [21–25], which allows the quantum computation to
be performed to be public and requires the decoding algorithm
to be independent of the depth of the computation. Indeed, we
are motivated by a particular quantum homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme, introduced in [23], that supports transversal eval-
uations of Clifford gates, and present a secret sharing scheme
that allows the evaluation of Clifford gates by requiring the n
non-interacting parties to perform the corresponding Clifford
operations in parallel. A constant number t of non-Clifford
gates can also be implemented via a coordinated gate telepor-
tation using logical magic states. Since the security of our
scheme is independent of the security of the quantum homo-
morphic encryption scheme in Ref. [23], the no-go results for
fully quantum homomorphic encryption schemes with both
perfect [26] and imperfect [27] information theoretic security
do not limit the class of circuits which can be evaluated.
Our secret sharing scheme comprises of four procedures as
described in Protocol 1. We label qubits according to a 2-
dimensional arrangement as depicted in Fig. 1. In the input
procedure of Protocol 1, N = s+ t qubits are initialized on a
single column, with the first s qubits containing the quantum
secret, and the last t qubits each initialized in the magic state
τ = I2 +
X+Y
2
√
2
, where I, X , Y , and Z are the usual Pauli matri-
ces. These magic states are consumed during the evaluation
in reverse order, starting from the last row. We focus on the
case where n−1 is divisible by 4. This is not a limiting factor,
since if this is not the case, one can simply prepare
⌈ n−1
4
⌉
+1
shares and give multiple shares to a single party. In the encod-
ing procedure of Protocol 1, n− 1 additional columns of N
qubits in the maximally mixed state are appended. This yields
an Nn-qubit quantum state arranged in a grid with N rows and
n columns. Subsequently a unitary encoding U is applied on
the Nn qubits, which spreads the quantum secret from the first
column to all the n columns. Here U = U1 ⊗ ·· · ⊗UN is a
tensor product of the unitaries U1, . . . ,UN , where each Ux acts
only on the x-th row of qubits and comprises of only CNOT
gates. SpecificallyUx = BxAx, where (i) Ax comprises of n−1
commuting CNOT gates with controls all on the first column
and targets on each of the remaining columns, and (ii) Bx com-
prises of n− 1 commuting CNOT with targets all on the first
column and controls on every other column. Although Ux is
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2Protocol 1 Secret sharing scheme
Here,Hx,y labels the qubit on the x-th row and the y-th column, and
Rx labels the qubits on the x-th row.
1. Input: From the s-qubit quantum secret, assign the x-
th qubit to Hx,1 for x = 1, . . . ,s. Assign τ to each of
HN−k+1,1, . . . ,HN,1.
2. Encoding: To prepare the x-th logical qubit for x= 1, . . . ,N:
(a) Prepare each ofHx,2, . . . ,Hx,n in state I2 .
(b) Apply Ax: Perform a CNOT with control on Hx,1 and
target onHx,y for every y= 2, . . . ,n.
(c) Apply Bx: Perform a CNOT with target on Hx,1 and
control onHx,y for every y= 2, . . . ,n.
3. Sharing: Assign the qubits in the y-th column to the y-th
share for y= 1, . . . ,n.
4. Decoding:
(a) Assemble the n shares.
(b) For each x= 1, . . . ,N, implement Bx followed by Ax on
Rx.
(c) Output the qubits in the first column, discarding all
other qubits.
a fixed unitary, the induced encoding is random because n−1
of the qubits that Ux acts on are random; the qubits from the
second column to the last column are initialized as either |0〉
or |1〉 with probability 1/2. This random encoding maps the
quantum secret into a random code which is a highly mixed
state, similar to Ref. [23]. In the sharing procedure of Proto-
col 1, the Nn-qubit quantum state is shared equally among n
parties, with each party receiving a single column of N qubits.
In decoding procedure of Protocol 1, the n shares are assem-
bled, the inverse encoding circuitU† is performed, and all but
the first column of qubits are discarded, which yields the N-
quantum secret on the first column.
To evaluate a quantum circuit on the shared secret, each
party performs quantum computation only on their share of
the quantum state. We consider the approximately univer-
sal model of quantum computation based on a discrete set
of gates composed of Clifford group gates and a single non-
Clifford group gate, in this case T = |0〉〈0|+ eipi/4|1〉〈1| al-
though other choices are possible. As we shall see, quantum
circuits composed of arbitrarily many Clifford gates and up to
some constant number t of T -gates can be evaluated on the
shared secret. We will consider the evaluation of a sequence
V = (V1, . . . ,VL) of such gates on the s-qubit quantum secret
shared by n parties. The gates V1, . . . ,VL are unitary matrices
on s qubits and are assumed to be known to every party. Us-
ing the knowledge of V , each party implements a sequence of
operations on their share of the qubits, as specified in Protocol
2. The computation is performed after the sharing procedure
and before the decoding procedure of Protocol 1, as we now
describe.
WhenVi is a Clifford gate that applies non-trivially on some
set of logical qubits, each party performsVi on the correspond-
ing subset of their column of qubits, thereby collectively im-
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FIG. 1. The upper portion of the figure shows the secret,
which is an s-qubit state located on the first column. The
qubits carrying the secret are shaded in red. The remaining
t states located on the first column are each initialized as a
magic state. These qubits are shaded in green. The unshaded
qubits are initialized in the maximally mixed state. The uni-
taries U1, . . . ,UN spread the states from qubits in the first col-
umn to qubits in the remaining columns, such that the encoded
secret resides in the first s rows of qubits. Each party receives
a single column of the encoded secret, together with their part
of the logical magic states.
Protocol 2 Gate evaluation on shared quantum secret
Given a gate Vi to be evaluated on the shared secret:
• Clifford group: If Vi is in the Clifford group each party ap-
plies Vi to their share.
• T -gates: If Vi is a T -gate on qubit j, each party y does as
follows
1. Apply a CNOT gate controlled by qubit j and targeted
on qubit N− k+1.
2. Apply a CNOT gate controlled by qubit N− k+ 1 and
targeted on qubit j.
3. Measure qubit N−k+1 in the computational basis, and
broadcast the result my.
4. If the parity of m = (m1, . . . ,mn) is odd, apply the cor-
rection operator SX to qubit j.
plementing V⊗ni . This procedure is depicted in Fig. 2A for
single qubit Clifford gates, and Fig. 2B for a CNOT gate. Let
P = {I,X ,Y,Z} denote the set of the Pauli matrices. Then
the fact that n−1 is divisible by 4 implies that for σ ∈P ,
Ux(σ ⊗ I⊗n−1)U†x = σ⊗n. (1)
Since Vi is in the Clifford group, it maps the Pauli group onto
itself,
Ux(ViσV †i ⊗ I⊗n−1)U†x =V⊗ni σ⊗n
(
V †i
)⊗n
. (2)
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FIG. 2. In this figure, all qubits that are part of the secret are
shaded in red, while those that are part of the logical magic
states are shaded in green. A) Multipartite implementation of
a logical single-qubit Clifford gate G on the x-th row. B) Mul-
tipartite implementation of a logical CNOT operator with the
control qubit and the target qubit on the j-th and k-th last row
respectively. C) A logical gate teleportation protocol that im-
plements a logical T -gate on the j-th logical qubit without the
measurement-dependent Clifford correction is depicted. Col-
lectively, the qubits on the row that is later measured are ini-
tialized in logical magic state. To implement the correction,
the measurement outcomes are made public, and each party
applies a single Clifford gate SX on the j-th qubit only when
the parity of m is odd.
Hence the transversal Clifford group gates correspond to the
logical Clifford group gates on our random codespace [23].
It is also possible to perform a constant number t of T -gates
on the quantum secret via gate teleportation. For each T -gate
that is to be performed, a logical magic state
τ˜ =
I⊗n
2n
+
X⊗n+Y⊗n
2n
√
2
(3)
must be prepared. This is achieved by the input and encod-
ing procedures of Protocol 1, however we do not rule out the
possibility of replacing this pre-sharing of magic states with
a procedure for the parties to interactively prepare states on
demand without the involvement of the initial sharer. Each of
these logical magic states is taken to be located on the last t
rows of the encoding. To prepare τ˜ on the x-th row, the first
qubit in the x-th row is initialized as TH|0〉with the remaining
qubits prepared in the maximally mixed state. The encoding
unitary Ux is subsequently applied. To evaluate the k-th T -
gate on qubit j of the shared secret, each party proceeds as
follows. They first apply a CNOT with control on the j-th
qubit and target on the k-th last qubit of their share. They then
apply a CNOT with control on the k-th last qubit and target on
the j-th qubit. Each party y then measures the k-th last qubit
in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis and broadcasts the measurement result
my to every other party over a public classical channel. Lastly,
if the parity of the measurement results m is odd, each party
applies a single-qubit Clifford gate SX on the j-th qubit. If
the parity is even, no such correction is necessary. This pro-
cedure is depicted in Fig. 2C. The evaluation of each T -gate
in this way amounts to the logical implementation of a gate
teleportation protocol that consumes one magic state [28].
We now describe how the evaluation of the T -gate works
by explicitly considering the operations that the n parties im-
plement. Denoting I = I⊗n, X = X⊗n, Y = Y⊗n and Z = Z⊗n,
the correct implementation of a logical T -gate on the state
ρ˜ = 2−n(I+ aX + bY + cZ) shared by the j-th qubit of each
party must yield
1
2n
(
I+
(a−b)√
2
X+
(a+b)√
2
Y + cZ
)
. (4)
This follows from the conjugation relations for the T -gate
given by TXT † = 1√
2
(X +Y ), TYT † = Y−X√
2
, and TZT † = Z.
After every party applies the CNOT gates as depeicted in
Fig. 2C, the joint quantum state on the j-th qubit and the k-
th last qubit of every party given by ρ˜ ⊗ τ˜ is mapped to the
state
I⊗ I+aI⊗X+bZ⊗Y + cZ⊗Z
22n
+
X⊗X+aX⊗ I+bY ⊗Z− cY ⊗Y
22n
√
2
+
Y ⊗X+aY ⊗ I−bX⊗Z+ cX⊗Y
22n
√
2
. (5)
To show this, we have used the commutation relations of the
CNOT with various two-qubit Pauli matrices [29, Eqs. (4.32)-
(4.37)]. The parity of m is equivalent to the observable Z on
the k-th last qubit of each share. If the parity is even, the
resultant state on the j-th qubit of every party is collectively
ρ˜even =
I
2n
+
(a−b)X
2n
√
2
+
(a+b)Y
2n
√
2
+
cZ
2n
, (6)
and the evaluation of the T -gate is successful. If the parity is
odd, however, the resultant state of these qubits is
ρ˜odd =
I
2n
+
(a+b)X
2n
√
2
+
(a−b)Y
2n
√
2
− cZ
2n
. (7)
Applying SX to each qubit transforms the state into ρ˜even, re-
sulting in a correct evaluation of the T -gate.
We now turn to the issue of security. This requires several
steps. First we show that the scheme outlined in Protocol 1 is
a (n,n)-threshold secret sharing scheme as claimed. We then
prove that the evaluation of quantum circuits on the shared se-
cret performed according to Protocol 2 does not compromise
the encoding. Specifically, we show that no subset of n− 1
parties can collude to produce any state correlated with the
encoded secret, beyond any prior knowledge they may have.
4A (k,n)-threshold quantum secret-sharing scheme [17, 18]
is a quantum operation that maps a secret quantum density
matrix to an encoded state that can be divided among n par-
ties such that (1) any k or more parties can perfectly recon-
struct the secret quantum state, and (2) any k− 1 or fewer
parties can collectively deduce no information at all about the
secret quantum state. The first property is trivially satisfied
by Protocol 1 when k = n, since the encoding procedure is
perfectly reversible with inverse operation given by the spec-
ified decoding procedure. Turning to the second property, we
consider the result of encoding a state
ρsecret = 2−s ∑
σ∈P⊗s
wσσ (8)
according to Protocol 1. Here σ = σ1⊗ . . .⊗σs and wσ = 1
when σ is the trivial Pauli operator, σ = I⊗s. It is the coef-
ficients wσ for the non-trivial Pauli operators σ in P⊗s that
collectively define the quantum secret. From Eq. 1 it follows
that the resulting state is
ρ˜secret = 2−s
(
∑
σ∈P⊗s
wσσ⊗n
)
⊗ τ˜⊗t , (9)
where the tensor product in σ⊗n is taken across different
shares of the secret. Property (2) then follows trivially, since
the reduced density matrix for any subsystem of n− 1 shares
(i.e. n−1 columns) is necessarily the maximally mixed state,
because all non-trivial σ are traceless.
Turning to the issue of the security of Protocol 2, we con-
sider the state of the system across a bipartition between a sin-
gle honest party, who follows the protocol, and the remaining
n− 1 parties who are not restricted in their actions. We now
show that the bits broadcast by the honest party are uniformly
random and independent of the actions of the other parties.
Given a sequence of gates (V1, . . . ,VL) with the honest party
acting as described by Protocol 2, our strategy is to show that
after evaluation of the `-th gate, the state of the system has the
form
ρ(`)joint = ∑
σ∈P⊗s
θ∈{I,X ,Y}⊗t−k
b(`)σ ,θ
(
σ ⊗θ
2N
)
⊗χ(`)σ ,θ , (10)
where k≤ ` is the number of T -gates in (V1, . . . ,V`), {b(`)σ ,θ} is
a set of scalars, and {χ(`)σ ,θ} is a set of operators on the Hilbert
space representing the system of the dishonest parties. We
have excluded the honest party’s measured qubits, as these
are in a product state with the rest of the system.
The proof proceeds by induction. We assume that the sys-
tem is in a state ρ(`−1)joint of the form of Eq. 10 after evaluation
of the first `−1 gates. If V` is a Clifford group gate, then the
honest party applies V` on some subset of the first s qubits of
their share, while the dishonest parties are free to perform any
completely positive and trace preserving map on their side of
the bipartition. Since V`I⊗sV †` = I
⊗s and V`P⊗sV †` =P
⊗s,
and since the operation applied by the dishonest parties on
their side of the bipartition is linear, the resulting state ρ(`)joint is
σ j⊗θk τ j,k (I⊗〈mH|)τ j,k(I⊗|mH〉)
I⊗ I I⊗ I I
I⊗X X⊗X 0
I⊗Y Y ⊗X 0
X⊗ I I⊗X 0
X⊗X X⊗ I X
X⊗Y Y ⊗ I Y
Y ⊗ I Z⊗Y 0
Y ⊗X Y ⊗Z (−1)mHY
Y ⊗Y −X⊗Z (−1)mH+1X
Z⊗ I Z⊗Z (−1)mHZ
Z⊗X Y ⊗Y 0
Z⊗Y X⊗Y 0
TABLE I. Table of values of (i) σ j⊗θk, (ii) the resulting op-
erator τ j,k after the application of steps 1 and 2 of the T -gate
procedure of Protocol 2, and (iii) (I⊗〈mH|)τ j,k(I⊗|mH〉) for
σk ∈P , θk ∈ {I,X ,Y}.
in the form of Eq. 10 as claimed. WhenV` is a T -gate on some
qubit j, the situation is more complicated. Since the actions
of the honest party only affect the j-th qubit and k-th last qubit
of their share, we will consider the effect of these actions on
all combinations of Pauli operators on these two qubits which
can have non-zero coefficients in ρ(`−1)joint . From the induction
assumption, these are given by the first column of Table I. The
effect of the honest party applying CNOT operations as pre-
scribed by the first two steps of the T -gate procedure in Pro-
tocol 2 is to transform these operators into the corresponding
Pauli operators given by the second column of Table I. As the
operator I⊗Z does not appear, it follows that the expectation
for mH, the measurement result of the honest party’s measure-
ment, is precisely zero. Hence mH is uniformly random and
independent of the non-trivial weights {bσ ,θ}. The effect of
the measurement on the Pauli operators is given by the third
column of Table I, which implies that the resulting state is in
the form of Eq. 10. Since the correction SX is merely a local
Clifford group operator, the final state ρ(`)joint is always of the
correct form independent of the parity of m. Since the initial
state after sharing, given by Eq. 9 is of the form of Eq. 10, the
induction hypothesis holds for all 0≤ `≤ L, and the measure-
ment results of the honest party convey no information which
can be used by the dishonest participants to recover ρsecret.
The scheme we have presented above, therefore, represents
a (n,n)-threshold secret sharing scheme that also allows for
the evaluation of quantum circuits on the shared secret without
lowering the threshold. While the complexity of such circuits
is limited in terms of the number of T -gates to the number of
corresponding magic states incorporated in the initial sharing,
whether it is possible to create such states as needed without
involvement of the initial sharer presents an interesting avenue
for future research. Intuitively, the security of our scheme
is based on a randomized error correction code which leaves
only weight n operators constant while admitting transversal
Clifford gates. This suggests that the use of less random error-
correction codes will allow for (k,n)-threshold schemes for
other values of k.
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